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Abstract
In this paper the problem of optimal derivative design, profit maximization and risk minimization
under adverse selection when multiple agencies compete for the business of a continuum of heterogenous
agents is studied. The presence of ties in the agents’ best–response correspondences yields discontinuous
payoff functions for the agencies. These discontinuities are dealt with via efficient tie–breaking rules.
In a first step, the model presented by Carlier, Ekeland & Touzi (2007) of optimal derivative design
by profit–maximizing agencies is extended to a multiple–firm setting, and results of Page & Monteiro
(2003, 2007, 2008) are used to prove the existence of (mixed–strategies) Nash equilibria. On a second
step we consider the more complex case of risk minimizing firms. Here the concept of socially efficient
allocations is introduced, and existence of the latter is proved. It is also shown that in the particular
case of the entropic risk measure, there exists an efficient “fix–mix” tie–breaking rule, in which case
firms share the whole market over given proportions.
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1 Introduction
This work lies at the intersection of the fields of multi–principal–multi–agent games under adverse selec-
tion and optimal risk sharing. The former emerged as an extension into oligopolistic competition of the
Principal–Agent models already studied in the 1970’s and early 1980’s by (among others) Maskin, Mussa,
Rosen and Akerlof; whereas the latter can be traced back to Borch (1962) and Arrow (1963), and it has
experienced a rebirth of sorts with the introduction of the notion of convex risk measures in the late 1990’s.
In the (standard) Principal–Agent model of non–linear pricing of hedonic goods, a monopolist (the
principal) has the capacity to deliver quality–differentiated products, which are assumed to lie on some
compact and convex set C ⊂ Rn. Such products are the technologically feasible goods from the point of
view of the principal. These vectors are usually called consumption bundles, and each of its coordinates
indicates how much a certain product possesses of a given attribute. In other words, goods are assumed to
be fully described by a list of qualities that are relevant to the consumers. The buyers (or agents) whom
the principal engages with the intent to trade have heterogenous preferences. This is captured by indexing
the different characteristics or agent types with vectors in some set Θ ⊂ Rm, and including the types in
the arguments of the buyers’ utility functions. The types are private information, i.e. the principal is
aware of their statistical distribution µ, but she cannot distinguish an agent’s type prior to engaging him.
The ill–informed principal designs incentive compatible catalogues with the intention of (at least partially)
screening the market. The trading is done on a take–it–or–leave–it basis and it is assumed there is no
second–hand market. The characterization of the solutions to problems of this kind can be found, among
others, in the works of Armstrong [2], Mussa & Rosen [24] and Rochet & Chone´ [34].
The standard Principal–Agent model was extended by Carlier, Ekeland & Touzi in [9] to model a
problem of optimal (over–the–counter) derivative design. They assume there is a direct cost to the principal
when she delivers a derivative contract or financial product (a typical example are mutual funds) and
that the agents’ utilities are of mean–variance type 1. This allows them to phrase the principal’s profit
maximization problem as a problem in the Calculus of Variations subject to convexity constraints, the
latter capturing the incentive compatibility constraints on the set of admissible catalogues. This approach
was further modified by Horst & Moreno–Bromberg in [21]. Here the authors assume the principal is
exposed to some non–headgeable risky position, which she evaluates using a convex risk measure. This
could be, for example, an insurer who has issued claims that are correlated to weather phenomena. The
principal’s aim is to minimize her exposure by laying off part of her risk with heterogenous agents. To do so
she proceeds as in [9] and designs a catalogue of derivatives written on her income, as well as a non–linear
pricing schedule. In contrast with Carlier, Ekeland & Touzi, in this case the impact of each individual
trade on the principal’s evaluation of her risk is non–linear, and an individual trade does not necessarily
reduce the principal’s exposure. The main results of both papers are existence and characterization of
direct revelation mechanisms that maximize the principal’s income ([9]) or minimize the principal’s risk
assessment ([21]).
A more complex scenario, in which our current model is embedded, contemplates an oligopoly. Ana-
lyzing oligopolistic competition, even in the absence of adverse selection, is qualitatively more daunting
than dealing with single–seller settings. For example, d’Aspermont & dos Santos Ferreira study in [4] the
existence of (Nash) equilibria in a common agency game (no asymmetric information). The presence of
competition, and the corresponding constraints that it adds to the firms’ optimization problems separates
their model from single–principal settings. They use Lagrange–multipliers methods to characterize the sets
of equilibria. Interestingly, the authors show that contingent on different choices of the model’s parameters,
1These are type-dependent utility functions of the form U(θ,X) = G(X)+θ ·F (X), where the asset–space is X , G : X → R
is linear and F : X → Θ.
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equilibrium outcomes may range from fully competitive to collusive. Not surprisingly, once one adds the
adverse selection ingredient to the problem things become more complex. The first challenge that needs
to be addressed when one studies existence of equilibria and/or Pareto optimal allocations is the fact that
the Revelation Principle, an important simplifying ingredient in the Principal–Agent literature, may no
longer be applied without loss of generality. In other words, some equilibrium allocations may not be imple-
mentable via direct revelation mechanisms. There are two ways to overcome this. The first one, introduced
by Epstein & Peters [14], consists in enlarging the message space to include not only the agent types, but
also a description of the market situations. Despite the theoretical value of this result, it is in general not
practical for applications. Alternatively, Martimort & Stole [25] and Page Jr. & Monteiro [28] developed
a multi–agency analogue of the Revelation Principle, the Delegation Principle, which allows enough sim-
plification of the general non–linear pricing game to have a workable setting. A second challenge is the
emergence of ties in the agents’ best–response mappings. When agents are indifferent between contracting
with different firms, then these firms’ payoff functions may have discontinuities. This precludes the use of
the classical results of Debreu, Glicksberg and Fan (see for example [19]) to guarantee the existence of Nash
equilibria. Instead, much of the current literature on the existence of Nash equilibria in multi–firm–agent
games relies on Reny’s seminal paper [32], and the necessary conditions he presents for the existence of
Nash equilibria in discontinuous games. The results of Bagh & Jofre´ in [5], and of Page Jr. & Monteiro
in [29] and [30] provide testable conditions that allow for Reny’s results to be used in multi–firm–agent
games. An alternate route has been taken by Carmona & Fajardo in [10]. The authors provide an existence
result of sub–game perfect equilibria in common agency games. Just as Martimort & Stole and Page &
Monteiro have done, they concentrate on catalogue games. They, however, present an extension of Simon
& Zame’s theorem that allows them to relax the assumption on exclusivity in contracting found, among
others, in [28]. Moreover, their model exhibits intrinsically generated sharing rules. The price to pay for
this level of generality is the required assumption of continuous (instead of upper semicontinuous) payoff
functions of the firms.
A second field that influenced this work could be broadly labeled “risk minimization and sharing” with
coherent or, more generally, convex risk measures. The notion of coherent risk measures was axiomatized
by Artzner, Delbaen, Ebert & Heath in [3] as an “acceptable” way to assess the riskiness of a financial
position. It was then extended to convex risk measures by, among others, Fo¨llmer & Schied [17] and
Frittelli & Rosazza Gianin [18]. This theory has experienced an accelerated development, as evidenced
by a large number of publications. Some quite natural questions to address, in a multitude of settings,
are the existence and structure of risk–minimizing positions or of risk–sharing allocations that are either
Pareto optimal or that constitute an equilibrium of some sort. The problem of optimal risk sharing for
convex risk measures was first studied by Barrieu & El Karoui in [6]. They gave sufficient conditions for
the risk–sharing problem with general state spaces to have a solution. Their conditions can be verified for
the special case where the initial endowments are deterministic and the agents use modifications of the
same risk measure; Jouini, Schachermayer & Touzi proved in [22] the existence of optimal risk–sharing
allocations when the economic agents assess risk using convex risk measures which are law–invariant. The
optimal allocations are Pareto optimal but not necessarily individually rational. That is, a cash transfer,
also called the rent of risk exchange, could be necessary to guarantee that the outcome leaves all parties
better off than they originally were. It should also be mentioned that the setting in in [22] is over–the–
counter (OTC) in nature, hence the question of efficiency and implementability cannot be left to the
market. Implementability could depend on the presence of a social planer who enforces cash–transfer
schemes or other policies that generate individually rational or socially optimal outcomes. In contrast,
equilibrium models do not require the presence of a regulator to guarantee the implementability of efficient
allocations. Implementability and efficiency is left up to the (financial) market. Equilibrium models of
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incomplete markets where agents use convex risk measures to evaluate their risk exposures were studied
by, e.g., Filipovic´ & Kupper in [15] in the static case and Cheridito et al. [8] in the dynamic one.
In this paper we study the problem of optimal derivative design, profit maximization and risk min-
imization under adverse selection when multiple agencies compete for the business of a continuum of
heterogenous agents. We first extend the model of profit maximization presented in [9] to a multi–firm
one. Here is where the theory of games played under adverse selection comes into play. In order to use
recent results from the theory of catalogue games, we assume that each firm’s strategy set consists of
the closed, convex hull of a finite number of basic products. We believe this is consistent with the idea
that each firm is exposed to a direct cost when delivering financial products or derivative securities, since
it must purchase the underlying assets that shall be structured into its’ product line. In mathematical
terms, such assumption renders the strategy sets compact with respect to the same topology for which
the players’ preferences are continuous (a necessary assumption), and therefore makes the game in hand
compact. We show that when the game is played under a particular kind of tie–breaking rules, then it
is uniformly payoff secure and reciprocally upper semicontinuous and hence has a mixed–strategies Nash
equilibrium. Such rules, which paraphrasing [30] we call efficient, might not be implemented if not for the
presence of a social planer. The regulator also plays a key role in our multi–agency extension of the risk
minimization model studied in [21]. In both cases the impact of a single trade on the firm’s risk evaluation
is highly non–linear and depends strongly on the firm’s overall position.2 This results in two considerable
technical difficulties. First, there is no reason to expect (and in general it will not be the case) that the
firms’ payoff functions will be uniformly payoff secure.3 Second, most of the current results ([5], [19],
[28], [26],...) on existence of Nash equilibria require some form of (quasi-) concavity (except [35] where a
complete, yet very challenging to verify, characterization of Nash equilibria is presented). In our model
these conditions are only satisfied by the mixed extension of the game. Even if the game were uniformly
payoff secure and (weakly) reciprocally upper semicontinuous (by no means a given),4 considering a mixed
extension of the game would mean the following: firms view linear aggregation of possible risk evaluations
as the way to assess the influence of others’ in their own risk. Whether this approach is consistent with the
ideas behind the theory of convex risk measure is in our opinion debatable. Taking the previous arguments
into account, we do not seek the existence of (mixed–strategies) Nash equilibria. Our focus is instead on
an existence proof for socially efficient allocations of risk exposures. Such risk allocations minimize the
firms’ aggregate risk and can hence be thought of as the multi–firm–agent game analogous of the Pareto
optimal allocations described in [22]. The proof of existence of efficient tie–breaking rules relies heavily
on the fact that for fixed price schedules and tie–breaking rule, the contracts that minimize the aggregate
risk can be expressed as the product of a type–independent random variable and a coefficient that depends
exclusively on types. This separation result was already observed in [21], but it is in this paper where it
is truly exploited. It is important to mention that efficient tie–breaking rules are generated endogenously.
This implies that in our OTC model efficiency and regulation go hand–in–hand, even in the absence of a
cash–transfer scheme. When it comes to implementability, we have obtained for the case of the entropic
risk measure that among all efficient tie–breaking–rules, there is a constant ratio of market shares. In other
words, there is a “fix–mix” ratio under which firms share the whole market, rather than segmenting it by
agent types. The latter implies that all the firms offer the same indirect utility to each of the consumers. A
real–world example where firms offer consumers essentially the same utility (using different products), and
where the assumption of mean–variance optimizing consumers is appropriate, is retail banking. In such
2In a model of profit maximization a firm contracts with some agent type independently of other types as long as that
particular type contributes positively to the firm’s revenues.
3The “worst–case” tie–breaking rule, where each firm assumes ties will be broken in the most disadvantageous way for
itself, does yield payoff security, but at the cost of reciprocally upper semicontinuity.
4This would imply the existence of Nash equilibria in mixed strategies
4
case “fix–mix” is also a reasonable assumption: retail banks differentiate customers according to their risk
aversion when designing portfolio strategies, but do not necessarily try to appeal differently to customers
with different attitudes towards risk. The methodology we used to obtain the “fix–mix” result suggests
that it carries over to more general risk measures. A full analysis would be quite technical though, and
certainly beyond the scope of this paper. We illustrate this result with a numerical example, in which we
also find that (as expected) firms are worse off in the presence of competition, whereas the contrary is the
case for the buyers. Moreover, the aggregate risk in the economy is better dealt with in the competitive,
yet regulated, case. The numerical algorithm that we use for this example, a hybrid descent method, is
also used to analyze an example where the firms are AV@R–minimizers. We find quite a sharp contrast in
the firms’ risk profiles before and after trading when comparing the entropic and AV@R cases, which obeys
the fact that when minimizing the latter, one should focus in the worst state of the world (our examples
use, unavoidably, a finite probability space) in as much as the problem’s constraint allow, then move to
the second worse and so on.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 contains the description of our general
framework. We leave the setting as general as possible while still describing the asymmetry of information
in the model, the best–response sets of the agents that give rise to ties, tie–breaking rules and the influence
of the social planer. In Section 3 we study the game played among profit–maximizing firms, where the main
result is the existence of mixed–strategies Nash equilibria. Section 4 is devoted to the risk–minimization
game, where we prove the existence of socially efficient allocations. Finally, we present in Section 5
numerical algorithms to estimate equilibrium points and socially efficient allocations in some particular
examples, as well as the “fix–mix” result mentioned above.
2 General Framework
We consider an economy that consists of two firms and a continuum of agents. We study both the case when
the firms are profit maximizers, and the one where their objective is to minimize the risk assessments of
some initial uncertain payoffs. The analysis of the two scenarios require different mathematical techniques
and distinct notions of efficient allocations, so we study the two models separately.5
2.1 The financially feasible sets
The firms compete for the agents’ business by offering derivatives contracts. The set from which firm
i = 1, 2 may choose products, i.e. its financially feasible set, is
Xi ⊂ L2 (Ω,F ,P) ,
where (Ω,F ,P) is a standard probability space. We assume these sets are closed, convex and bounded,
and that 0 ∈ Xi. The boundedness of Xi implies there is M > 0 such that ‖Xi‖2 ≤ M for all Xi ∈ Xi.
Any additional requirements on the sets Xi shall be introduced when necessary.6 Throughout this paper
we use the notation
Xn
‖·‖2−−→ X, Xn a.s.−−→ X and Xn w.−→ X
to indicate that the sequence {Xn} converges strongly, almost surely and weakly to X. We also use 11A to
denote the indicator function of a set A.
5Our arguments can be extended to an economy with m firms. We chose to work on the case m = 2 for simplicity.
6We omit writing i = 1, 2 when we refer to properties shared by both firms.
5
In the literature on multi–firm, non–linear pricing games, it is generally assumed that each firm chooses
a compact subset Yi from its financially feasible set, and it devises a (non-linear) pricing schedule
pi : Yi → R.
Each pair (X, pi(X)) (where X ∈ Xi) is called a contract. Then the Delegation and Competitive Taxation
Principles (see for example [28]) allow for a without–loss–of–generality analysis of the existence of Nash
equilibria by studying the (simpler) catalogue game played over compact subsets of the product–price space
Xi×R. In fact, the boundedness assumption on Xi implies that prices belong to some compact set P ⊂ R.
We also study games played over catalogues, but their structure will be case–dependent. We write Ci to
denote a catalogue offered by firm i, and (C1, C2) for a catalogue profile (also called a market situation).
We postpone the specification of the criterions that the firms aim to optimize until Sections 3 and 4.
2.2 The agents’ preferences
The agents are heterogenous, mean–variance maximizers whose set of types (or characteristics) is
Θ = [a, 1] for some a > 0.
The right endpoint of Θ has been normalized to 1, but it could be any finite value. What is required is for
the set of types to be a compact subset of the strictly positive real numbers. An agent’s type represents her
risk aversion (hence the assumption a > 0 means there are no risk–neutral agents). In other words, given
a contingent claim Y an agent of type θ assesses its worthiness via the (type–dependent) utility function
U(θ, Y ) = E[Y ]− θVar[Y ].
The types are private information and not transparent to the firms. They are distributed according to a
measure µ, which we assume is absolutely continuous with respect to Lebesgue measure. The measure µ
is known to all firms. In other words, firms cannot distinguish an agent’s type when engaging in trading
with her (or they are legally prevented from doing so) but they know the overall distribution of types.
This asymmetry of information, also known as adverse selection, prevents the firms from extracting all
the above–reservation–utility wealth form each agent. The knowledge of µ is therefore essential for the
agencies.7 In the upcoming sections we require the following auxiliary lemma:
Lemma 2.1 The family of functions U = {U(θ, ·) | θ ∈ Θ} is uniformly equicontinuous.
Proof. Let  > 0 and consider X,X ′ ∈ X , and θ ∈ Θ, then
|U(θ,X)− U(θ,X ′)| = |E[X]− θVar[X]− E[X ′] + θVar[X ′]|.
From the triangle inequality and the fact that 0 < θ ≤ 1 we get
|U(θ,X)− U(θ,X ′)| ≤ |E[X]− E[X ′]|+ |Var[X]−Var[X ′]|.
It follows from the Cauchy-Schwartz inequality that
|E[X]− E[X ′]| ≤ dP(X,X ′) and |Var[X]−Var[X ′]| ≤ dP(X,X ′)
(∫
Ω
|X +X ′|dP+ |E[X] + E[X ′]|
)
,
where dP(X,X ′) is the L1–distance with respect to P. Since −M ≤ X,X ′ ≤M, we obtain
|U(θ,X)− U(θ,X ′)| ≤ dP(X,X ′) (1 + 4M) ≤ (1 + 4M) ‖X −X ′‖2.
Setting δ =  (1 + 4M)
−1
yields the desired result.
2
7We could make additional assumptions on µ and allow for a = 0.
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2.3 Indirect utilities and best–response sets
When an agent faces a catalogue profile (C1, C2), she chooses a single contract from some Ci on a take–
it–or–leave–it basis. Agents may choose any (available) contract they wish, but no bargaining regarding
prices or products takes place. Given (C1, C2), the indirect utility of an agent of type θ is:
v(θ, C1, C2) , sup
{
U(θ,X)− p | (X, p) ∈ Ci for some i
}
.
We assume that the agents have an outside option that yields their reservation utility, which we normalize
to zero for all agents. For a fixed market situation, the function v(·, C1, C2) : Θ → R is convex, since it
is defined as the pointwise supremum of affine functions of θ. The presence the outside option guarantees
v ≥ 0. The best–response set of the agents of type θ to a certain catalogue profile is defined as:
L(θ, C1, C2) , argsup
{
U(θ,X)− p | (X, p) ∈ Ci for some i
}
.
In Sections 3 and 4 we make necessary assumptions on Ci as to guarantee L(θ, C1, C2) 6= ∅ for all θ ∈ Θ.
Agents of type θ are indifferent among the elements of L(θ, C1, C2), which they strictly prefer over any
other contract that can be chosen from (C1, C2). The Envelope Theorem (see for example [23]) implies
that for any (X(θ), p(θ)) ∈ L(θ, C1, C2)
v′(θ, C1, C2) = −Var[X(θ)] µ− a.s.. (1)
In particular v′(·, C1, C2) ≤ 0 µ-a.s.. Equation (1) provides a valuable link between optimal contracts (from
the point of view of the agents) and the indirect utility functions.
In order to exploit the information contained in µ, firms must choose catalogues that do not offer the
agents incentives to lie about their types. If firm i intends to (partially) screen the market, the subset
Ci(θ) ⊂ Ci of products from which it expects agents of type θ to make their choices must satisfy
E[X(θ)]− θVar[X(θ)]− p(θ) ≥ E[Y ]− θVar[Y ]− q, ∀ (X(θ), p(θ)) ∈ Ci(θ), (Y, q) ∈ Ci.
Catalogues that satisfy this property are called incentive compatible. Let
L(θ, Ci) , argsup
{
U(θ,X)− p | (X, p) ∈ Ci
}
,
then Ci is incentive compatible if and only if Ci(θ) = L(θ, Ci).8 A catalogue where the products intended
for agents of type θ yield at least their reservation utility is said to be individually rational. Since all
reservation utilities are zero, an individually rational catalogue satisfies
E[X(θ)]− θVar[X(θ)]− p(θ) ≥ 0 ∀ (X(θ), p(θ)) ∈ L(θ, Ci).
In the presence of the outside option, participation in the market is endogenously determined.
2.4 Tie–breaking rules & market segmentation
A crucial element of multi–firm games is the presence of ties. There is no reason to assume that for a given
catalogue profile (C1, C2) the sets L(θ, C1, C2) (θ ∈ Θ) will be singletons. This fact renders the analysis
considerably harder than it is for principal–agent games, where the Revelation Principle allows for such
8It has been shown in [34] that in general principal–agent models it is not possible to perfectly screen the market. In most
instances there is a non–negligible set of agents who are pushed down to their reservation utilities (bunching of the first type),
and another one where agents stay above their reservation levels, but they choose the same product despite the fact of their
different preferences (bunching of the second type). In all likelihood, this behavior is inherited by multi–firm models.
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assumption. There can be both inter– and intra–firms ties, i.e. an agent may be indifferent between two
products that are offered by distinct firms, or maybe between two contracts that are offered by the same
agency. In what follows we study mechanisms via which ties are broken, as well as the partitions of Θ that
are generated by tie–breaking. In order to study the ties that originate from a catalogue profile (C1, C2),
we define
v(θ, Ci) = vi(θ) , sup
{
U(θ,X)− p | (X, p) ∈ Ci
}
,
which are the one–catalogue analogues to v(θ, C1, C2). The vi’s are related to v(θ, C1, C2) via
v(θ, C1, C2) = max
{
v(θ, C1), v(θ, C2)
}
.
Some important properties of the functions v(θ, Ci) are summarized in Lemma 2.2 below. In a nutshell
it states that the indirect utility functions generated by incentive compatible catalogues are convex, and
that there is a crucial link between the derivatives of such functions at a given type and the variance of
the contracts that such type may choose.
Lemma 2.2 Let (C1, C2) be a catalogue profile and assume L(θ, Ci) 6= ∅ for all θ ∈ Θ, then:
1. The functions v(·, Ci) : Θ→ R are convex.
2. If Ci is incentive compatible then −Var[Xi(θ)] ∈ ∂v(θ, Ci) for all (Xi(θ), pi(θ)) ∈ Ci(θ). In particular,
the equation −Var[Xi(θ)] = v′(θ, Ci) holds µ-a.s..
Proof. The mapping θ 7→ U(θ,X) − p is affine on the θ-th coordinate, so v(θ, Ci) is defined as
the pointwise supremum of affine mappings and it is therefore convex (see for example Proposition 3.1
in [13]). By assumption L(θ, Ci) 6= ∅, an applying the Envelope Theorem as above we have that for any
(Xi(θ), pi(θ)) ∈ L(θ, Ci), −Var[Xi(θ)] =∈ ∂v(θ, Ci). The assumption of incentive compatibility implies
that if (Xi(θ), pi(θ)) ∈ Ci(θ), then −Var[Xi(θ)] = v′(θ, Ci) µ-a.s..
2
If for θ0 ∈ Θ we have vi(θ0) > v−i(θ0), then the agents of type θ0 will contract with firm i. The set of
types that are indifferent between the firms’ offers is
Θ0 ,
{
θ ∈ Θ | v(θ, C1) = v(θ, C2)
}
.
To avoid ambiguities we assume that if vi(θ) = v−i(θ) = 0 then the corresponding agents opt for the
outside option. The market is then segmented in the sets
Θ1 , {v1 > v2}, Θ2 , {v2 > v1} and Θ0.
In order to deal with types in Θ0 whose indirect utility is not zero, we define the set of tie–breaking rules
as
F ,
{
f ∈ L0[a, 1] | 0 ≤ f ≤ 1}.
From this point on, given a TBR f we write f1 = f and f2 = 1 − f. Then fi ≡ 1 on Θi, fi ≡ 0 on Θ−i,
and for θ0 ∈ Θ0 the proportion fi(θ0) contracts with firm i.
In the sections below, we rephrase in as much as possible the interaction of the firms in terms of the
indirect utilities generated by the catalogues they offer. This provides a clearer understanding of the
market’s segmentation, and in mathematical terms it allows us to use well established convex analysis
machinery. To this end we define
Ci ,
{
v : Θ→ R+ | v ≥ 0,∃{X(θ)}θ∈Θ ⊂ Xi s.t. v′(θ) = −Var[X(θ)]
}
.
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These are the sets of all possible (single–firm) indirect utilities that can be generated from incentive
compatible catalogues contained in Xi. The incentive compatibility is reflected in the requirement v′(θ) =
−Var[X(θ)], as in Lemma 2.2. We show below that these sets exhibit convenient compactness properties.
Proposition 2.3 The sets Ci are compact for the topology of uniform convergence.
Proof. When firm i designs a product line, it takes into account that
−M2 ≤ E[X]− θVar[X] ≤M.
This implies that all prices p ∈ P must be below M to satisfy the individual rationality constraint. In
counterpart −M2 ≤ p, otherwise all agents would be guaranteed an indirect utility above their reservation
utility. Since ‖X‖2 ≤M for all X ∈ Xi, then |v′i| ≤M for all vi ∈ Ci, thus
0 ≤ vi ≤ 3 ·max
{
M,M2
}
.
The convexity of the elements of the (closed) set Ci implies they are locally Lipschitz (see for example [31]);
moreover, the L2–boundedness of Xi together with Equation (1) imply the Lipschitz coefficients are uni-
formly bounded. This in turn means that Ci is a bounded, closed and uniformly equicontinuous family,
which by the Arzela`–Ascoli is then compact for the topology of uniform convergence.
2
2.5 The social planer
The fundamental theorems of welfare economics establish the equivalence between competitive equilibria
(in complete markets) and efficiency, in the sense that frictionless competition leads to Pareto optimal
allocations of resources and viceversa. In contrast, in OTC markets participants do not respond to given
prices and therefore optimality is an inadequate notion to study. Instead, in the sections below we deal
with the existence of Nash equilibria and socially efficient allocations.
Whereas in perfectly competitive settings market forces interact as to eventually reach efficient out-
comes, OTC markets may require the influence of a social planer (a regulator) in order to achieve efficiency.
This indirect market participant plays two important roles: First, he may choose to enforce certain kinds
of TBRs in order to guarantee Nash and/or socially efficient outcomes. Second, he must make sure that
individual rationality at the level of firms is preserved. This crucial implementability condition is a non–
issue in competitive markets, where equilibrium allocations are also individually rational. Alternatively,
given that socially efficient allocations are aggregately individually rational, the regulator could focus on
efficiency and then establish a payment scheme among firms. These payment scheme would play the role
that equilibrium prices do in competitive markets.
In what follows we assume that we work on regulated OTC markets, where the roles of the social
planner are to seek that the market settles for socially (aggregate) optimal allocations, and that the latter
are individually rational for the agencies.
3 Profit Maximization
In this section we analyze a non–cooperative game played among profit–maximizing firms under adverse
selection. Our model is an extension into a multi–firm setting to the one studied in [9]. We show that if
efficient tie–breaking rules are implemented (possibly through the influence of a regulator), then the game
possesses a Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies.
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3.1 The firms’ strategy sets & payoff functions
The theory of equilibria in multi–firm games developed (among others) in [25], [27] and [28] requires the
strategy sets to be compact metric spaces. Moreover, the agents’ preferences must be continuous with
respect to a topology that makes the strategy sets compact. In our view this implies that in general the
strategy sets are actually closed and bounded sets of a finite–dimensional vector space. Following along
the same lines, and with the aim of describing a profit–maximization model of OTC trading of derivatives
contracts, we suppose that firms structure the latter from a set of “basic” products. These products are
available in markets to which agents do not have access, and could be, for instance, OTC markets between
“high–rollers”. The firms are then exposed to a cost when delivering each of these products.
We assume Xi is the closed convex hull of a finite number of basic products {X1i , . . . , Xmii }, and that
the cost to firm i of delivering Xi ∈ Xi is given by a lower semicontinuous function
Ki : Xi → R.
The per–contract profit of firm i when it sells claim Xi given the price schedule pi : Xi → R is
pi(Xi)−Ki(Xi).
Analyzing a multi–firm game played over non–linear price schedules would be daunting at best. Here the
Revelation Principle (see for example [28]) comes to our rescue. In a nutshell, it states that the game
played over product–price catalogues, i.e. elements of
Pi ,
{
Ci ⊂ Xi × P | Ci closed
}
,
is as general as the one played over closed subsets of Xi and non–linear price schedules. We recall that
P ⊂ R is the compact set where feasible prices lie. We assume that firms compete for the agents’ business
by offering product–price catalogues. In other words, the strategy sets Pi are the sets of all compact subsets
of Xi ×P. We endow Pi with the Hausdorff metric h. Since Xi ×P is a compact metric space, so is (Pi, h)
(see, for example [1], Section 3.17); furthermore, Tychonoff’s theorem guarantees that P , P1 × P2 with
the corresponding product metric hp is also compact and metric. We write B(P) for the Borel σ-algebra in
P. The following proposition allows us to substitute, without loss of generality, a catalogue profile (C1, C2)
for the agents’ optimal choices associated with the market situation (C1, C2), i.e., for(⋃
θ
L(θ, C1),
⋃
θ
L(θ, C2)
)
as these sets are closed and hence compact.
Proposition 3.1 For any catalogue Ci ∈ Pi, the set
⋃
θ L(θ, Ci) is closed.
Proof. Consider (X¯, p¯) ∈ cl(⋃θ L(θ, Ci)), then there exists a sequence {(Xn, pn)} ⊂ ⋃θ L(θ, Ci) such
that
(Xn, pn)
‖·‖2×|·|−−−−−→ (X¯, p¯).
By construction (Xn, pn) ∈ L(θ, Ci) for some θ ∈ Θ, call it θn. Passing to a subsequence if necessary we
may assume there is θ¯ ∈ Θ such that θn → θ¯ and (Xn, pn)→ (X¯, p¯) pointwise. If (X¯, p¯) ∈
⋃
θ L(θ, Ci) we
are done, so let us assume the contrary, thus
E[X¯]− θ¯Var[X¯]− p¯ < E[X]− θ¯Var[X]− p ∀ (X, p) ∈ L(θ¯, Ci). (2)
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By definition
E[Xn]− θnVar[Xn]− pn ≥ E[X]− θnVar[X]− p ∀ (X, p) ∈ Ci.
However, the (a.s.) convergence of the sequence {(Xn, pn)} implies
E[X¯]− θ¯Var[X¯]− p¯ ≥ E[X]− θ¯Var[X]− p ∀ (X, p) ∈ Ci,
which would imply (X, p) ∈ L(θ¯, Ci), contradicting Equation (2).
2
The maximal attainable profit for firm i from type θ given the (incentive compatible) catalogue profile
(C1, C2) is
pii(θ, C1, C2) , max
{
(p−K(X))11{vi≥v−i}(θ) | (X, p) ∈ Ci
}
.
Here the functions vi are as defined in Section 2.4. The functions pii are the building blocks of the firms’
payoff functions and enjoy the following important continuity property:
Proposition 3.2 (Page Jr. [27]) The maps pii : Θ× P → R are upper semicontinuous on P and B(Θ)×
B(P)-measurable.
For a given TBR f, the payoff function of firm i is given by
Πi(C1, C2) ,
∫
Θ
pii(θ, C1, C2)fi(θ)µ(dθ).
These payoff functions exhibit a highly discontinuous behavior, due to the presence of ties. However, the
effect of each type–wise trade on the overall income of the firm is linear and easily quantifiable. Moreover,
only agents who make a positive contribution to a firm’s revenues contract with it. This last fact plays a
role in the analysis of payoff security contained in Section 3.3.2.
3.2 Efficient tie–breaking rules & reciprocal upper semicontinuity
Roughly speaking, a TBR is said to be efficient if an agent contracts with a firm if and only if the latter
values her as a customer at least as much as the competition. As we show below, this is equivalent to
saying that an efficient TBR maximizes the aggregate profit for a given market situation (C1, C2).
Definition 3.3 Given a catalogue profile (C1, C2), a tie–breaking rule f ∈ F is called efficient if
• pii(θ, C1, C2) ≥ pi−i(θ, C1, C2) implies fi(θ) > 0,
• pii(θ, C1, C2) < pi−i(θ, C1, C2) implies fi(θ) = 0.
The definition above is equivalent to saying that f∗ is efficient given the catalogue profile (C1, C2) if and
only if ∑
i
Πi(f
∗, C1, C2) = sup
f∈F
∑
i
Πi(f, C1, C2),
which shows that in general efficient TBRs are endogenously determined. In mathematical terms, efficient
TBRs yield certain upper semicontinuity properties to the payoff functions of the firms, which are necessary
to guarantee the existence of Nash equilibria.
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Definition 3.4 A game
{
(Πi,Pi)
}
is said to be reciprocal upper semicontinuous (RUSC) for a given
TBR f if the mapping
(C1, C2) 7→
∑
i
Πi(f, C1, C2)
is upper semicontinuous.
The notion of RUSC games was introduced by Dasgupta and Maskin in [11] (labeled as complementary
discontinuous or u.s.c–sum games) and later generalized by Reny in [32] in order to prove the existence of
Nash equilibria in certain discontinuous games. Intuitively, in a RUSC game firm i can only approximate
the payoff corresponding to a market situation (C1, C2) by actually playing Ci. We should note that
Reny’s definition is slightly stronger, but the one above (from [11]) is sufficient for our needs. Furthermore,
Proposition 5.1 in [32] tells us that RUSC is inherited by the mixed extension of a game.
Lemma 3.5 (Page Jr. & Monteiro [29]) If the game
{
(Pi,Πi)
}
is played using efficient TBRs, then it is
RUSC.
Proof. Consider the mapping (C1, C2) 7→
∑
i Πi(f
∗, C1, C2). If f∗ is efficient then we have∑
i
Πi(f
∗, C1, C2) = sup
f∈F
∑
i
Πi(f, C1, C2)
= sup
f∈F
∑
i
∫
Θ
pii(θ, C1, C2)fi(θ)µ(dθ)
=
∫
Θ
max
i
pii(θ, C1, C2)
∑
i
fi(θ)µ(dθ) for any f ∈ F
=
∫
Θ
max
i
pii(θ, C1, C2)µ(dθ).
It follows from Proposition 3.2, that (C1, C2) 7→ maxi pii(θ, C1, C2) is upper semicontinuous, hence so is∑
i Πi(f
∗, C1, C2).
2
Notice that the definition of efficient TBR, together with the linear aggregation of type-wise profits, implies
that the mapping (C1, C2) 7→
∑
i Πi(f, C1, C2) is independent of the TBR played if the latter it is efficient.
3.3 Existence of Nash equilibria
In this section we study necessary conditions for the existence of Nash equilibria in the agencies’ game. We
cannot employ the canonical results of Debreu, Glicksberg and Fan, given the discontinuities introduced
by the TBRs. Instead we rely on the results of Page Jr. & Monteiro [28] and Reny [32]. Since the payoff
functions Πi are not quasiconcave, one cannot prove the existence of pure–strategies equilibria using the
state–of–the–art results available in the literature. Instead we analyze the existence of mixed–strategies
equilibria. In order to do so we show uniform payoff security of the game. This notion allows one to
conveniently test the payoff security of a game’s mixed extension.
3.3.1 Defining the mixed–strategies game
To define a mixed catalogue game, we let M(Pj) be the set of probability measures on (Pi,B(Pi)). We
endow the mixed catalogue strategy sets M(Pi) with the σ(X∗, X)-topology generated by the dual pair
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〈L0(Pi,B(Pi)),M(Pi)〉. The game is played as follows: Each agency chooses an element λi ∈M(Pi), and
its profit under the profile λ = (λ1, λ2) is given by
Πi(λ) ,
∫
P
Πi(C1, C2)λ(dC), (3)
where λ(dC) = λ1(dC1)λ2(dC2) is the corresponding product measure. By Proposition 3.2 the integrand
is measurable, thus expression (3) is well defined. The game
{
(M(Pi),Πi)
}
is the mixed catalogue game
that extends
{
(Pi,Πi)
}
.
Definition 3.6 A mixed profile λ is a Nash equilibrium for the game
{
(M(Pi),Πi)
}
if
Πi(λi, λ−i) ≥ Πi(λ′i, λ−i) for all λ′i ∈M(Pi).
A Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies for
{
(M(Pj),Πi)
}
can be viewed as an equilibrium in pure strate-
gies for its mixed extension.
3.3.2 Uniform payoff security
A game in which the players’ strategy sets are compact subsets of a topological space and their payoff
functions are bounded is called compact. The mixed extension of the game in hand is a compact game.
This is due to the fact that the sets M(Pi) are closed, convex and bounded subsets of (L0(Pi,B(Pi)))∗,
thus by the Banach–Alaoglu theorem they are σ(X∗, X)-compact. Reny provides sufficient conditions for
existence of a Nash equilibrium in a compact game in the presence of discontinuous payoff functions. A
key requirement is that the game is payoff secure. Intuitively this means that small deviations on the part
of firm i’s competitors can be answered to with a deviation that leaves firm i within a small interval of its
profit prior to deviations.
Definition 3.7 Given the payoffs Πi : Pi → R, the catalogue game
{
(Pi,Πi)
}
is payoff secure if for all
(C1, C2) ∈ P, and  > 0 there exist C∗i ∈ Pi and δ > 0 such that
Πi(C
∗
i , C
′
−i) ≥ Πi(Ci, C−i)− 
for all C ′−i ∈
{
D ∈ P−i | hp(D,C−i) < δ
}
.
Payoff security of a game does not imply the same property for its mixed extension; however, such is the
case with uniform payoff security (see Theorem 1 in [29]). Proving uniform payoff security of a game is
simpler than dealing with the weak∗-topology to show payoff security of its mixed extension.
Definition 3.8 The catalogue game
{
(Pi,Πi)
}
is uniformly payoff secure if for all i = 1, 2, Ci ∈ Pi
and  > 0 there exist C∗i such that for all C−i ∈ P−i there exists δ > 0 that satisfies
Πi(C
∗
i , C
′
−i) ≥ Πi(Ci, C−i)− 
for all C ′−i ∈
{
D ∈ P−i | hp(D,C−i) < δ
}
.
Proposition 3.9 The game
{
(Pi,Πi)
}
is uniformly payoff secure (hence the game
{
(M(Pj),Πi)
}
is payoff
secure).
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Proof. Let Ci ∈ Pi and  > 0 and define
Ci ,
{
(X, p− ) | (X, p) ∈ Ci and p−  ≥ Ki(X)
} ∪ {(0, 0)},
i.e. Ci is obtained from Ci by keeping all contracts that allow for an –decrease in prices without this
rendering a negative price–cost benefit. All other contracts are replaced by
{
(0, 0)
}
. Lemma 2.1 implies
there is δ > 0 such that if d
(
(X, p), (X ′, p′)
)
< δ (where d(·, ·) is the distance generated by ‖ · ‖2×| · |) then
for all θ ∈ Θ
|U(θ,X)− p− U(θ,X ′) + p′| < . (4)
Assume first that pii(θ, Ci, C−i) >  and let (X, p) ∈ Ci be such that U(θ,X) − p = pii(θ, Ci, C−i). Then
(X, p− ) ∈ Ci . Now consider C ′−i such that hp(C−i, C ′−i) < δ, and let (X ′, p′) ∈ C ′−i. By definition there
exist (Y, q) ∈ C−i such that d
(
(Y, q), (X ′, p′)
)
< δ, and by Equation (4)
U(θ,X)− (p− ) ≥ U(θ, Y )− (q − ) > U(θ,X ′)− p′.
The latter implies that (X ′, p′) /∈ L(θ, Ci , C ′−i) and in turn that an efficient TBR f for (Ci , C ′−i) satisfies
fi(θ) = 1. Thus
pii(θ, C

i , C
′
−i)fi(t) ≥ pii(θ, Ci , C ′−i).
The inequality above is trivially fulfilled if pii(θ, Ci, C−i) ≤ . We have that for any deviation C ′−i such that
hp(C−i, C ′−i) < δ and for any efficient TBR f
Πi(C

i , C
′
−i) ≥
∫
Θ
pii(θ, C

i , C
′
−i)fi(θ)µ(dθ)− 
= Πi(Ci, C−i)− .
2
The proof of Proposition 3.9 is a particular case of the proof of Theorem 1 in [30]. We have included
it here because it showcases how the linear aggregation of type–wise profits is key to the existence of Nash
equilibria. The simple yet far reaching construction of Ci is only possible in such case. Our result on
existence of Nash equilibria relies on the following
Theorem 3.10 (Reny [32]) Suppose that G = {(Xi, ui)}mi=1 is a compact game which is also quasiconcave,
reciprocally upper semicontinuous and payoff secure, then it possesses a pure–strategies Nash equilibrium.
It follows from Lemma 3.5 that the (compact) game
{
(M(Pi),Πi)
}
is RUSC. The payoff functions are
linear in each firm’s strategy, hence quasiconcave. Proposition 3.9 then allows us to apply Theorem 3.10
to the mixed extension of the game
{
(Pi,Πi)
}
to obtain the following
Theorem 3.11 The game
{
(Pi,Πi)
}
possesses a mixed–strategies Nash equilibrium.
4 Risk Minimization
In this section we analyze the risk minimization problem faced by firms that have some initial risky
endowments. The goal of the firms is to lay off parts of their risk on individual agents. This is done
via OTC trading of derivatives contracts. The model presented here is the multi–firm version of the
one introduced in [21]. In contrast with the previous section, we do not seek to prove the existence of
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Nash equilibria, but rather of socially efficient allocations. The main difficulty towards guaranteeing Nash
equilibria stems from the non–linear, per–type impact on the firms’ risk assessments. In the previous
sections, the fact that any agent contracting with an agency had a positive impact on its revenues was
essential to show uniform payoff security and RUSC. This is no longer the case for risk–minimizing firms.
Here the risk associated to the aggregate of a firm’s initial position plus a contract could be lower than
the firm’s initial risk assessment, but once all positions are taken into account, the firm might be better
off not engaging the agents who would have chosen such contract.
4.1 The firms’ strategy sets & risk assessments
The initial risky endowment of each firm is represented by a random variable Wi ∈ L2 (Ω,F ,P). Firm i
assesses its risk exposure using a convex and law invariant risk measure
%i : L2 (Ω,F ,P)→ R ∪ {+∞},
which has the Fatou property. We refer the reader to Appendix C for a discussion on these maps, as well
as related references. We restrict the firms’ choices to catalogues of the form
Ci =
{
(Xi(θ), pi(θ))
}
θ∈Θ.
These are not direct revelation mechanisms: even if firm 1 were to offer the individually rational and
incentive compatible catalogue C1, the presence of firm 2 might dissuade agents of type θ0 from choosing
(X1(θ0), p1(θ0)). For a given catalogue profile (C1, C2) and a given TBR f, the position of firm i after
trading is
Wi −
∫
Θi
(pi(θ)−Xi(θ))µ(dθ)−
∫
Θ0
(pi(θ)−Xi(θ))fi(θ)µ(dθ),
where Θi and Θ0 are as defined in Section 2.4. If we write pi(θ) = θv
′
i(θ, C1, C2) − vi(θ, C1, C2), and we
rename X(θ) = X(θ)− E[X(θ)],9 then firm i’s risk assessment after trading is
Ai(C1, C2, f) , Ri(C1, C2, f)− Ii((C1, C2, f),
where
Ri(C1, C2, f) , %i
(
Wi −
∫
Θi
Xi(θ)µ(dθ)−
∫
Θ0
Xi(θ)fi(θ)µ(dθ)
)
,
denotes firm i’s risk and the associated income is given by
Ii((C1, C2, f) ,
∫
Θi
(θv′i(θ)− vi(θ)µ(dθ) +
∫
Θ0
(θv′i(θ)− vi(θ))fi(θ)µ(dθ).
As we have seen before, when a catalogue profile (C1, C2) is presented to the agents, the corresponding
indirect utility functions (v1, v2) show how the market is segmented. The more interesting set is Θ0, i.e.
the set of indifferent agents. Within this set, there are two intrinsically different situations. First, v1 and
v2 may be identical over a non–negligible subset. These could be regarded as “true” ties, in the sense that
they will have different impacts on the firms’ risk assessments under different TBRs. Second, there could
be types for which v1 and v2 are secant. We show below that given our assumptions on µ, these types do
not have a direct impact on the aggregate incomes (in fact they do not impact the Ai’s, but we do not
require this for our arguments). However, they do indicate the points where agents switch from contracting
with one firm to the other one, in other words they show where the customers’ preferences shift.
9This is possible due to the translation invariance of %i, and fully characterizes pi in terms of vi.
15
Definition 4.1 Given a pricing schedule (v1, v2) ∈ C1×C2, we say that there is a shift in the customers’
preferences at θ ∈ int(Θ) if
(v1(θ−)− v2(θ−)) · (v1(θ+)− v2(θ+)) < 0.
Proposition 4.2 For any pricing schedule (v1, v2) ∈ C1 ×C2 the set Θs of shifts in the customers’ prefer-
ences satisfies:
1. Θs has at most countably many elements.
2. The derived set of Θs has measure zero.
Proof. The set Θs(v1, v2) is the union of the closures of the sets
Θ1s , {θ ∈ Θ | v1(x) = v2(x), v′1(x) 6= v′2(x)}
and
Θs , {θ ∈ Θ | v1(x) = v2(x), v′1(x) = v′2(x), |v1(x˜)− v2(x˜)| > 0 ∀ x˜ ∈ B(, x) \ {x},  > 0} .
The set Θ1s is denumerable and nowhere dense. This follows directly from the convexity of v1 and v2 and
the fact that the corresponding supporting planes to graph{v1} and graph{v2} at (θ, v1(θ)) are secant. By
definition Θ2 is denumerable and nowhere dense, since any two of its elements can be separated. Therefore
cl{Θ1s} and cl{Θs} are themselves denumerable and nowhere dense.
2
As a result of the preceding proposition we see that the set of pre–images of the crossings of the graphs
of two functions v1 ∈ Ci and v2 ∈ C2 has µ–measure zero, which yields the following
Corollary 4.3 Let v1 ∈ C1 and v2 ∈ C2, then the set {v1 = v2} ∩ {v′1 6= v′2} is of µ–measure zero.
As a consequence of Corollary 4.3, we have that the aggregate income of the firms is independent of the
TBR, namely ∑
i
Ii(C1, C2, f) =
∫
Θ0
(θv(θ)− v′(θ))µ(dθ) +
∑
i
∫
Θi
(θv′i(θ)− vi(θ)µ(dθ).
Finally we define
A(C1, C2, f) ,
∑
i
Ai(C1, C2, f).
4.2 Socially efficient allocations
A market situation (C∗1 , C
∗
2 ), together with a TBR f
∗ is said to be a socially efficient allocation10 if it
minimizes the aggregate risk in the economy and if it is individually rational at the agencies’ level; in other
words if A(C∗1 , C
∗
2 , f
∗) solves the problem
Ψ , inf
v
inf
f
inf
X
{
A(C1, C2, f) | −Var[Xi(θ)] = v′i(θ), Ai(C1, C2, f) ≤ %i(Wi)
}
.
As it was the case in Lemma 2.2, the variance constraints −Var[Xi(θ)] = v′i(θ) capture the incentive
compatibility of the catalogues Ci, while Ai(C1, C2, f) ≤ %i(Wi) is firm i’s individual rationality constraint.
10From this point on we use the shorthand SEA to refer to a socially efficient allocation.
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As we mentioned in Section 2.5, in absence of a competitive market one cannot rely on equilibrium pricing
to take care of the issue of individual rationality. It is therefore necessary to work under the constraints
Ai(C1, C2, f) ≤ %i(Wi), for otherwise one could end up with allocations that are optimal on the aggregate
level, yet unenforceable. An alternative would be to establish a cash–transfer system, which should be
supervised by the regulator. We comment further on the latter in Section 4.2.4. In the remainder of this
section we study the existence of SEAs, and we show that the presence a regulator is required in order
for such allocations to be attainable and/or implementable. Our existence result depends heavily on the
implementation of efficient TBRs.
Definition 4.4 Let C = (C1, C2) be a catalogue profile. A tie–breaking rule f¯ ∈ F is efficient for C if
A(C1, C2, f¯) = inf
f∈F
{
A(C1, C2, f)
}
.
From the definition above one observes that efficient TBRs are endogenously determined. Here we encounter
the first need for the social planner in our risk–minimization setting, as it could be the case that unless
regulated, efficient TBRs would not be implemented.
4.2.1 Minimizing the risk for fixed incomes and tie–breaking rule
In a first step, we fix (v1, v2) ∈ C1×C2 (hence the firms’ incomes), as well as f ∈ F. We shall abuse notation
slightly and write Ri(v1, v2, Xi, f) for Ri(C1, C2, f). We then analyze the problem
Ψ1 , inf
(X1,X2)
{∑
i
Ri(v1, v2, Xi, f)
∣∣ −Var[Xi(θ)] = v′i(θ) and Ai(v1, v2, Xi, f) ≤ %i(Wi)}.
This problem can be decoupled into the sum of the infima, since the choice of Xi bears no weight on the
evaluation of R−i. Hence we must study the solution(s) to the following single–firm problems:
inf
Xi
{
Ri(vi, v−i, Xi, f)
∣∣ −Var[Xi(θ)] = v′i(θ) and Ai(v1, v2, Xi, f) ≤ %i(Wi)} .
To deal with the individual rationality constraints, we define
X v,fi ,
{
Xi ∈ Xi | Ai(v1, v2, Xi, f) ≤ %i(Wi)
}
,
which is the set of individually rational products for the given price schedule (v1, v2), and
X kvii ,
{
X ∈ Xi | ‖Xi‖22 ≤ kvi
}
where kvi , vi(a) − vi(0). The set X k
v
i
i contains all the products that can be structured as to construct
incentive compatible catalogues given (v1, v2), with k
v
i providing a bound to the L2–norm of the products
via the constraint −Var[Xi(θ)] = v′i(θ). We elaborate further into the kvi ’s in Appendix A, where we also
provide an outline of the proof of existence of solutions to Ψ1 stated in Lemma 4.5. The proof is analogous
to that of Theorem 2.3 in [21], and we include it for completeness.
Lemma 4.5 For v ∈ C1 × C2 and f ∈ F given, if X k
v
i
i ∩ X v,fi 6= ∅ then there exist Xv,fi ∈ Xi such that
Ψ1 = R1(v1, v2, X
v,f
1 , f) +R2(v1, v2, X
v,f
2 , f).
Remark 4.6 It should be mentioned that individual rationality may be verified ex–post. If a solution Xv,fi
to the minimization problem
inf
Xi
{
Ri(vi, v−i, Xi, f)
∣∣ −Var[Xi(θ)] = v′i(θ)}
satisfies Ai(v1, v2, X
v,f
i , f) ≤ %i(Wi), then X k
v
i
i ∩X v,fi 6= ∅. If on the contrary, Ai(v1, v2, Xv,fi f) > %i(Wi),
then the solution set of Ψ1 is empty.
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In order to establish the existence of an efficient TBR it is important to characterize the optimal
contracts Xv,fi . Specifically, we show below that X
v,f
i can be multiplicatively decomposed into a θ–
dependent function and an ω–dependent random variable. To this end, we construct the Lagrangian
associated to minimizing Ri(vi, v−i, Xi, f) subject to the moment conditions E[Xi(θ)] = 0 and Var[Xi(θ)]+
v′i(θ) = 0, and we compute the Freche´t differential of Ri at Xi in the direction of h ∈ Xi :
R′i(Xi)h = %
′
i
(
Wi −
∫
Θi
Xi(θ)µ(dθ)−
∫
Θ0
Xi(θ)fi(θ)µ(dθ)
)(
−
∫
Θi
h(θ)dθ −
∫
Θ0
h(θ)fi(θ)µ(dθ)
)
.
Since, for all H ∈ L2(Ω,P), the map K 7→ %′i(H)K is linear, it follows from the Riesz representation
theorem that there is a random variable ZXv,fi
∈ L2(Ω,P) such that
R′i(Xi)h =
∫
Ω
ZXv,fi
(
−
∫
Θi
h(θ)dθ −
∫
Θ0
h(θ)fi(θ)µ(dθ)
)
dP.
Let g : F → L0(Θ, µ) be given by
g(f) = 11Θi + 11Θ0f.
The operator Ri has an extremum at Xi under our moment constraints if there exist Lagrange multipliers
λi, ηi ∈ L2(Θ, µ) such that∫
Ω
∫
Θ
h(θ)
(
−ZXv,fi g(fi)(θ) + ηi(θ) + 2λi(θ)Xi(θ)
)
µ(dθ)dP = 0.
for all h ∈ Xi. Since (θ, ω)→ −ZXv,fi g(fi)(θ) + ηi(θ) + 2λi(θ)Xi(θ) is an integrable function, the DuBois–
Reymond lemma implies
− ZXv,fi g(fi)(θ) + ηi(θ) + 2λi(θ)Xi(θ) = 0. (5)
Using the moment conditions EP[X
v,f
i (θ)] = 0 and Var[X
v,f
i (θ)] = −v′i(θ) we obtain
ηi(θ) = EP
[
ZXv,fi
]
g(fi)(θ) and λi(θ) =
g(fi)(θ)
√
Var
[
ZXv,fi
]
2
√−v′i(θ) .
Inserting the expressions for the Lagrange multipliers into Equation (5) yields
Xv,fi (θ) =
√
−v′i(θ)Z¯v,fi , (6)
where
Z¯v,fi ,
(
ZXv,fi
− E[ZXv,fi ])/√Var[ZXv,fi ].
Equation (6) shows that the minimizers of problem Ψ1 form collinear families in X . Moreover, the ran-
domness stemming from (Ω,P) and and the one induced by (Θ, µ) are decoupled. This property will prove
to be key in Section 4.2.2, where we show the existence of efficient TBRs. The previous discussion yields
the following characterization result:
Proposition 4.7 Let (Xv,f1 , X
v,f
2 ) be a solution to Ψ1. Then X
v,f
i takes the form
Xv,fi (θ, ω) =
√
−v′i(θ)Z¯v,fi (ω)
for some normalized random variable Z¯v,fi on (Ω,F ,P).
If either Xv,f1 or X
v,f
2 do not satisfy Ai(v1, v2, X
v,f
i , f) ≤ %i(Wi), then using the standard convention
inf{∅} =∞ we would have Ψ1 =∞. In terms of the program Ψ, this guarantees that only pricing schedules
and TBRs that offer the possibility of constructing individually rational catalogues stand a chance to be
chosen.
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4.2.2 Existence of efficient tie–breaking rules
In this section we show that for a given price schedule (v1, v2) there is a TBR f
v such that the corresponding
optimal product lines (Xv,f
v
1 , X
v,fv
2 ) minimize the aggregate risk evaluation of the firms. For v = (v1, v2) ∈
C1 × C2 we define
R˜i(v1, v2, f) , %i
(
Wi − Zv,fi (ω)
(∫
Θi
√
−v′i(θ)dθ +
∫
Θ0
fi(θ)
√
−v′i(θ)µ(dθ)
))
and
Fv ,
{
f ∈ F |
∑
i
R˜i(v1, v2, f) <∞
}
.
We then have to solve the problem
Ψ2 , inf
Fv
∑
i
R˜i(v1, v2, f).
If Fv = ∅, then as above Ψ2 =∞. Otherwise we must verify the lower semicontinuity of the mapping
f 7→ R˜1(v1, v2, f) + R˜2(v1, v2, f), f ∈ Fv.
To this end consider a minimizing sequence {fn} ⊂ Fv. The Banach–Alaoglu theorem guarantees that
{fn} is weakly convergent11 to some fv ∈ Fv. Since Vi(θ) ,
√−v′i(θ) belongs to L2(Θ, µ) for all vi ∈ Ci,
then ∫
Θ0
fni (θ)Vi(θ)dθ →
∫
Θ0
fvi (θ)Vi(θ)µ(dθ). (7)
Let
av,ni ,
∫
Θi
Vi(θ)dθ +
∫
Θ0
fni (θ)Vi(θ)µ(dθ).
For fv we define avi analogously. From (7) we have that a
v,n
i → avi . Since ‖Zv,f
n
i ‖2 ≤ 1 for all n, there
exists Zvi ∈ L2(Ω,P) such that ‖Zvi ‖2 ≤ 1 and
Zv,f
n
i
w.−→ Zvi .
Therefore Y v,ni , a
v,n
i · Zv,f
n
i converges weakly to Y
v
n , avi · Zvi . It follows from the Fatou property of %i
that
%i(Wi − avi · Zvi ) ≤ lim inf
n→∞ %i(Wi − a
v,n
i · Zv,f
n
i ).
From the lower semicontinuity of the norm in terms of weak convergence we have
Var [Zvi Vi(θ)] ≤ −v′i(θ).
Proceeding as in Section 4.2.1, we have that
R˜i(v1, v2, f
v) ≤ %i(Wi − avi · Zvi ).
Therefore
2∑
i=1
(
R˜i(v1, v2, f
v)− Ii(v1, v2, fv)
)
= inf
f∈F
{ 2∑
i=1
(
R˜i(v1, v2, f)− Ii(v1, v2, f)
)}
.
We denote by (Xv1 , X
v
2 ) any optimal list of claims associated to the pricing schedules (v1, v2) and the TBR
fv. For notational convenience we define
A(v1, v2) ,
2∑
i=1
(
R˜i(v1, v2, f
v)− Ii(v1, v2, fv)
)
.
11We omit writing “up to a subsequence” when exploiting the compactness of sets, but it should of course be kept in mind.
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4.2.3 Minimizing with respect to the firms’ incomes
To finalize the proof of existence of a SEA, we let {(vn1 , vn2 )} be a minimizing sequence of
2∑
i=1
(
R˜i(v1, v2, f
v)− Ii(v1, v2, fv)
)
.
We get from Proposition 2.3 that there exist (v¯1, v¯2) ∈ C1 × C2 such that vni → v¯i uniformly. This implies
that V ni → V¯i almost surely (see for example Proposition A.4 in [12]). Moreover, for any θ ∈ Θ where
convergence holds, it is uniform. We have from Fatou’s lemma and the fact that 0 ≤ −Ii(v1, v2, f) for any
(v1, v2) ∈ C1 × C2 and any f ∈ F that
2∑
i=1
−Ii(v¯1, v¯2, f v¯) ≤ lim inf
n→∞
2∑
i=1
−Ii(vn1 , vn2 , fv
n
).
In order to deal with the risky part of the firms’ problems we require the following
Lemma 4.8 Let {φn}, {ψn} ⊂ L2(Ω,P) and φ, ψ ∈ L2(Ω,P) be such that
φn
‖·‖2−−→ φ and ψn w.−→ ψ, then 〈φn, ψn〉 → 〈φ, ψ〉,
where 〈·, ·〉 is the canonical inner product in L2(Ω,P).
Proof. Adding and subtracting 〈φ, ψn〉 from |〈φn, ψn〉 − 〈φ, ψ〉| we obtain∣∣〈φn, ψn〉 − 〈φ, ψ〉∣∣ ≤ ∣∣〈φn − φ, ψn〉∣∣+ ∣∣〈φ, ψn − ψ〉∣∣.
Since {ψn} is a weakly convergent sequence, it is bounded. Let K¯ be such bound, then using the Cauchy–
Schwarz inequality we have ∣∣〈φn, ψn〉 − 〈φ, ψ〉∣∣ ≤ K¯ ‖φn − φ‖2 + ∣∣〈φ, ψn − ψ〉∣∣.
As n→∞, the first summand on the righthand side of the inequality converges to zero due to the strong
convergence of the φn’s to φ; the second summand converges to zero due to the weak convergence of the
ψn’s to ψ, which concludes the proof.
2
We show in Proposition 4.9 that if it were the case that the market segments exhibited no jumps in their
limiting behavior then then there would exist SEAs. By absence of jumps we mean that
11Θn0
a.s.−−→ 11Θ¯0 and 11Θni
a.s.−−→ 11Θ¯i ,
where Θ¯0 = {v¯1 = v¯2} and Θ¯i = {v¯i > v¯−i}. This “nice” convergence of the Θni ’s is by no means the general
scenario. As an example let vn1 ≡ v1 and vn2 = v1 + 1/n. Here Θn1 ≡ Θ, Θ2 ≡ ∅, but in the limit only
Θ¯0 6= ∅. Nonetheless, the existence result of SEAs under the assumption of convergence of the indicator
functions is relevant for the general case, and we present it below.
Proposition 4.9 Let {(vn1 , vn2 )}, (v¯1, v¯2) ⊂ C1 × C2 such that vni → v¯i uniformly. Assume that 11Θnj → 11Θ¯j ,
and let X¯1, X¯2 and f¯ be the (weak) limits of X
vn
1 , X
vn
2 and f
vn . Then
lim inf
n→∞
2∑
i=1
R˜i(v
n
1 , v
n
2 , f
vn) ≥
2∑
i=1
%i
(
Wi −
∫
Θ¯i
X¯iµ(dθ)−
∫
Θ¯0
f¯i X¯iµ(dθ)
)
≥
2∑
i=1
%i
(
Wi −
∫
Θ¯i
X v¯i µ(dθ)−
∫
Θ¯0
f v¯i X
v¯
i µ(dθ)
)
,
where (X v¯1 , X
v¯
2 , f
v¯) solves the social planer’s problem for (v¯1, v¯2).
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Proof. The second inequality follows from the definition of (X¯1, X¯2, f¯). To show that the first one holds,
we first use Proposition 4.7 and write∫
Θni
Xv
n,fv
n
i µ(dθ)−
∫
Θn0
fni X
vn,fv
n
i µ(dθ) = Z
vn,fv
n
i
∫
Θ
(
11Θni (θ)− fv
n
i 11Θn0 V
n
i (θ)
)
µ(dθ) , avni · Zv
n,fv
n
i .
The assumption on the convergence of the indicator functions 11Θnj implies that
V ni 11Θn0
a.s.−−→ V¯i 11Θ¯0 .
Since |V ni 11Θn0 |, |V¯i 11Θ¯0 | ≤M and µ(Ω) <∞, by Lebesgue Dominated Convergence we get
V ni 11Θn0
‖·‖2−−→ V¯i 11Θ¯0 .
Hence, by Lemma 4.8 we have that av
n
i → a¯i, where
a¯i ,
∫
Θ
(
11Θ¯1(θ)− f¯ 11Θ¯0 V¯i(θ)
)
µ(dθ).
Therefore
av
n
i · Zv
n
i
w.−→ a¯i · Z¯i,
and the Fatou property of the risk measure yields
2∑
i=1
Ri(v¯1, v¯2, Xi, f) ≤ lim inf
n→∞
2∑
i=1
R˜i(v
n
1 , v
n
2 , f
vn).
2
We now deal with the possibility of non–convergence of the indicator functions. We first observe that the
Θn0 ’s are closed subsets of Θ, which is compact. The set
2¯Θ := {A ⊂ Θ | A 6= ∅ and A is closed}
endowed with the Hausdorff metric h : 2¯Θ → R+ is a compact metric space (see for example [1], Chapter
3). If Θn0 6= ∅ infinitely often, then there exists Θˆ0 ∈ 2¯Θ such that, up to a subsequence if necessary
Θn0
h−→ Θˆ0.
Moreover, Θˆ0 is contained in Θ¯0. If, on the contrary, Θ
n
0 = ∅ for all but a finite number of n’s, then we
define the Hausdorff limit of {Θn0} as the empty set, which is again contained in Θ¯0. In both instances we
observe that there can only be more ties in the limit, and hence more ways of breaking them. This suggests
that the aggregate risk in the limit is indeed no greater than the aggregate risk in the pre–limit.
As for the sets Θni , if θ is not eventually in either of them, then either θ ∈ Θˆ0 or it is a type whose
preferences alternate. However, the limiting behavior of the latter is that of indifference, due to the
convergence of the functions vni . In other words, an agent type θ eventually always contracts with the same
firm i, alternates between firms or is always indifferent. Thus,
θ ∈ Θn0 for all sufficiently large n or θ ∈ Θ¯0.
We now decompose the type space into subsets for which the associated indicator functions converge. To
this end, we define
Θ˜n0 , Θ¯0 \Θn0 , and Θ˜ni , Θni \ Θ˜n0 .
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The sets Θ˜ni contain the “surviving customers”, in the sense that there will be no jumps towards indifference
from types in Θ˜ni at the limit; Θ˜
n
0 is the set of “alternating customers”. By construction
Θ = Θ˜n0 ∪Θn0 ∪ Θ˜n1 ∪ Θ˜n2 = Θ¯0 ∪ Θ˜n1 ∪ Θ˜n2 .
The following lemma shows that the sets Θ˜ni of “surviving customers” converge to the sets of agent types
that contract with firm i when (v¯1, v¯2) is offered.
Lemma 4.10 For i = 1, 2 we have 11Θ˜ni
→ 11Θ¯i .
Proof. Let θ ∈ Θ be given. There are two possible cases. Either there exists N ∈ N such that if n > N,
then θ ∈ Θ˜ni or there exists a subsequence {vnk1 , vnk2 } such that θ /∈ Θ˜nki for all nk. In the former case the
(uniform) convergence of the vni ’s implies v¯i(θ) > v¯−i(θ). In the latter case, either θ eventually belongs to
Θ˜n−i, in which case convergence of the indicator functions follows or θ ∈ Θ˜n1 ∩ Θ˜n2 infinitely often. In this
case θ ∈ Θ˜n0 and we again have convergence of the indicators.
2
Let us now assume that the social planer’s problem were such that at every stage n all agent types that
belong to the set of “alternating customers” are deemed indifferent. This results in more tie–breaking
possibilities. Specifically we consider the social planer’s problem
A∗(vn1 , v
n
2 ) = inf
fn∈F
inf
X
{ 2∑
i=1
%i
(
Wi −
∫
Θ˜ni
Xni µ(dθ)−
∫
Θ˜n0 ∪Θn0
fni X
n
i µ(dθ)
)∣∣∣Var[Xni (θ)] = −(vni )′(θ)}.
A subset of the possible choices of the fni ’s is F
n
0 , which is defined as the set of f˜ ∈ F such that
f˜(θ) =

0, vni (θ) < v
n
−i(θ)
1, vni (θ) > v
n
−i(θ)
f(θ), otherwise,
for some TBR f ∈ F. We then have that
A∗(vn1 , v
n
2 )|F0 = A(vn1 , vn2 ).
Thus,
A(vn1 , v
n
2 ) ≥ A∗(vn1 , vn2 ).
Consider a minimizing sequence {(vn1 , vn2 )} with (uniform) limit (v¯1, v¯2). Lemma 4.10 guarantees that 11Θ˜ni →
11Θ¯i ; moreover Θ˜
n
0 ∪Θn0 ≡ Θ¯0 so patently 11Θ˜n0∪Θn0 → 11Θ¯0 . These two facts allow us to apply Proposition 4.9
to A∗(vn1 , v
n
2 ), which yields
lim inf
n→∞ A(v
n
1 , v
n
2 ) ≥ lim inf
n→∞ A
∗(vn1 , v
n
2 )
≥
2∑
i=1
%i
(
Wi −
∫
Θ¯i
X∗i µ(dθ)−
∫
Θ¯0
f∗i X
∗
i µ(dθ)
)
,
where (X∗1 , X
∗
2 , f
∗) solves the social planer’s problem for (v¯1, v¯2). This shows that (X∗1 , X
∗
2 , f
∗) is indeed
optimal because {(vn1 , vn2 )} was required to be a minimizing sequence. We have proved the following
Theorem 4.11 If firm i assesses risk using a law invariant risk measure
%i : X → R ∪ {+∞},
which has the Fatou property, and if it offers catalogues of the form
Ci =
{
(Xi(θ), pi(θ))
}
θ∈Θ,
then there exists a socially efficient market situation.
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4.2.4 Individual rationality revisited
We can also deal with a slightly different setting, in which the regulator’s presence would be necessary
for the enforcement of a cash transfer. Namely, assume that (C∗1 , C
∗
2 , f
∗) is a solution to the problem Ψ
without the individual rationality constraints Rˆi(C1, C2, f) ≤ %i(Wi). Since both firms could simply offer
(0, 0), a minimization of A(·, ·, ·) would be IR on the aggregate level. Then there would exist r ≥ 0 (the
rent of risk exchange) such that
A(C∗1 , C
∗
2 , f
∗) = %1(W1) + %2(W2)− r
We define a transfer SEA to be a quadruple (C∗1 , C
∗
2 , f
∗, T ∗) such that
1. Ψ = A(C∗1 , C
∗
2 , f
∗),
2. Rˆ1(C
∗
1 , C
∗
2 , f
∗)− T ∗ ≤ %1(W1),
3. Rˆ2(C
∗
1 , C
∗
2 , f
∗) + T ∗ ≤ %2(W2),
and T ∗ ∈ [r1, r2] for some r1, r2 ∈ R such that r2 − r1 = r. The arguments contained in Sections 4.2.1,
4.2.2 and 4.2.3 can be immediately applied to prove the following
Corollary 4.12 If firm i assesses risk using a law invariant risk measure
%i : X → R ∪ {+∞},
which has the Fatou property, and if it offers catalogues of the form
Ci =
{
(Xi(θ), pi(θ))
}
θ∈Θ,
then there exists a transfer socially efficient market situation.
5 Examples: Risk Minimization
In this section we focus our attention on two well–known risk measures: entropic and average value at
risk. When it comes to the latter, we mostly present in Section 5.3 the results of applying the numerical
algorithm that is described in Appendix B to some specific examples12. As for the entropic risk measure,
before proceeding with the numerical simulations, we present in Section 5.1 a structural result that exploits
the risk measure’s particular structure. Moreover, we show that in this case there is a SEA where both
firms service all of the agents, and for which the optimal TBR is a constant proportion over the whole
market. We refer to such efficient TBRs as “fix–mix” rules.
5.1 Entropic–risk–minimizing firms
In what follows we concentrate on a situation where the firms use the entropic risk measure as a means to
assess their risk exposure, i.e.
%i(X) =
1
γi
ln EP [exp(−γiX)] .
The coefficient γi represents firm i’s risk aversion. This particular choice of risk measures, which is closely
related to exponential utility, allows us to further the analysis into the structure of SEAs. Moreover, given
12All of our codes are available upon request
23
that it is strictly convex and that it has a closed–form representation it lends itself very well to numerical
exercises. For vi and f given, Proposition 4.7 allows us to write program Ψ1 (the minimization with respect
to the firms’ claims for fixed incomes and TBR in Section 4.2.1) as
inf
(Z1,Z2)∈Γi×Γ2
2∑
i=1
%
(
W − Zi
(∫
Θi
√
−v′i(θ)µ(dθ) +
∫
Θ0
√
−v′i(θ)fi(θ)µ(dθ)
))
,
where
Γi := {Z ∈ Xi | E[Z] = 0, ‖Z‖22 = 1}.
The structure above allows us to write (See Section 3.4.2 in [21]) the minimization problem of firm i as
that of finding a stationary point to the Lagrangian
L(Z, τ, κ) = ln
(∫
Ω
e−γi(W+Za(vi,fi))dP
)
+ τ
∫
Ω
ZdP+ κ
∫
Ω
Z2dP,
where τ and κ are the Lagrange multipliers associated to the moment constraints, and
a(vi, fi) =
∫
Θi
√
−v′i(θ)µ(dθ) +
∫
Θ0
√
−v′i(θ)fi(θ)µ(dθ).
This in turn results in the following implicit representation for the optimal claims given vi and f, which
has a unique solution for each realization zv,fi of Z
v,f
i and wi of Wi :
Zv,fi = −
e−γi(Wi+Z
v,f
i a(vi,fi)) − E
[
e−γi(Wi+Z
v,f
i a(vi,fi))
]
√
Var
(
e−γi(Wi+Z
v,f
i a(vi,fi))
) . (8)
Remark 5.1 The indirect utility functions vi and the TBR fi only affect the optimal claims Z
v,f
i via the
“aggregator” a(vi, fi).
The previous remark has interesting repercussions for the socially efficient TBRs. Indeed, assume the
firms have initial endowments Wi and they are characterized by risk aversion coefficients γi. Theorem 4.11
guarantees the existence of a SEA (v∗1 , v
∗
2 , f
∗, Z∗1 , Z
∗
2 ), which yields the following aggregate risk in the
economy:
%1
(
W1 − a(v∗1 , f∗1 )Z∗1
)
+ %2
(
W2 − a(v∗2 , f∗2 )Z∗2
)
+ I[v∗1 , v
∗
2 ], (9)
where I[v∗1 , v
∗
2 ] represents the firms’ aggregate income (which is independent of f
∗). We know from Re-
mark 5.1 that any modification on f∗ that leaves a(v∗i , f
∗
i ) unchanged bears no weight on the value of
expression (9). We can redefine
f∗(θ) =

0, v1(θ) < v2(θ)
1, v1(θ) > v2(θ)
f∗(θ), otherwise,
and define
v∗(θ) , max
{
v∗1(θ), v
∗
2(θ)
}
,
which then allows us to write
a(v∗i , f
∗
i ) =
∫
Θ
√
−(v∗)′(θ)f∗i (θ)µ(dθ).
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Once we have defined the TBR over the whole Θ, we may go one step further and write
K ,
∫
θ
√−(v∗)′(θ)f∗(θ)µ(dθ)∫
θ
√−(v∗)′(θ)µ(dθ) ,
then
a(v∗1 , f
∗
1 ) = K
∫
Θ
√
−(v∗)′(θ)µ(dθ) and a(v∗2 , f∗2 ) = (1−K)
∫
Θ
√
−(v∗)′(θ)µ(dθ).
An interesting economical conclusion from the computations above is that there exists a SEA that consists
of both firms servicing the whole market, and splitting the customers in a K to 1 −K proportion. This
follows from the fact that only v∗ (the upper envelope of the original v∗i ) appears in each firm’s program.
In markets such as regulated health–insurance, where firms are legally prevented from abstaining from
contracting with any agent, the regulator may oversee that a socially optimal proportion of the market is
serviced by each firm.
5.2 Simulations (Entropic–risk minimizing firms)
In this section we provide the numerical analysis of a particular example of the entropic–risk minimizing
firms analyzed above. To this end we set
• Dimension of the space defining v: 6, dimension of Ω: 14,
• W1 = 0.5 ∗ (−1,−3,−9,−3,−1,−0.2,−0.1,−0.1,−0.2, 1,−3,−9,−3,−1)T ,
• W2 = 0.5 ∗ (−0.03,−0.1,−0.18,−0.2,−1,−3,−9,−10,−3,−1,−0.2,−0.18,−0.1,−0.03)T ,
• risk aversion coefficient γ = 2.
5.2.1 Risk assessments
Let us benchmark the aggregate risk in the competitive economy against the risk in a monopolistic setting.
To this end, we first fix f ≡ 1. This corresponds to a model in which firm 1 acts as a monopolist and firm
2 has no access to the market. The a-priori aggregate risk in the economy is 7.36. The risk assessment of
firm 1 is reduced from 3.53 to 2.16 after the it has traded with the agents while the risk of firm 2 stays
the same. Below we plot the numerical result for Z, as well as the theoretical one from Equation (8) in
Figure 1(a) and the corresponding minimizing v (the agents’ indirect utility) in Figure 1(b). Likewise, if we
fix f ≡ 0, which again yields a principal–agent setting (competition–wise) for firm 2, we obtain that this
firm’s initial risk is 3.84, which is reduced to 2.30 after trading. Finally, once we let f vary, the aggregate
risk decreases from 7.36 to 5.39, and the corresponding final risk assessments for the firms are 2.17 and
2.67 respectively. While each individual firm is worse off in the presence of competition, it should be noted
that the decrement in the aggregate risk in the economy is lower in either case where only one firm has
access to the market. Risk decreases from 7.36 to 5.99 when only firm 1 is active, and from 7.36 to 5.72 if
it is firm 2 who trades with the agents.
5.2.2 Risk profiles
With respect to the ex–ante and ex–post risk profiles, we observe that trading has a smoothing effect,
flattening spikes that correspond to the bad states of the World. However the basic shape of the risk
profile remains, which is in contrast to what we find in Figure 4 of our AV@R example. This is presented
in Figure 2, where the 14 elementary events have been connected by lines for illustration purposes. Figure 3
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(a) Numerical v.s. theoretical values for Z (b) The minimizing v
Figure 1: Comparison results for the f ≡ 1 case.
(a) Comparison of W1 and W1 − a(v∗1 , f∗1 )Z∗1 (b) Comparison of W2 and W2 − a(v∗2 , f∗2 )Z∗2
Figure 2: Positions before and after trading.
shows the agents’ indirect utilities associated to each firm’s offer, and compares it to the indirect utility for
the agents who face a monopolist (in this case firm 1). The market is shared at a 0.42 to 0.58 ratio between
the firms. We observe that the upper envelope u(θ) = max{v1(θ), v2(θ)} dominates the monopolistic
situation for all agents. In conclusion, this particular example is in line with the intuition that competition
among sellers benefits the buyers. Moreover, the competitive setting also provides a lower aggregate risk
exposure. A point could be made that the regulator should make sure that enough incentives exist for all
firms to engage in risk–minimizing trading, as it is socially desirable.
Remark 5.2 Arguably, the implementation of an efficient TBR in full generality could prove to be a
daunting task. However, the structure of Zv,fi presented in Equation (8) suggests that in general these
variables depend on v and f only via the integral expression a(v, f). If such were the case, one could achieve
an optimum by choosing an efficient “fix-mix” TBR, where each firm caters to a constant proportion of
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Figure 3: Indirect utilities under monopoly and oligopoly.
the whole market. The latter clearly makes the implementation considerably simpler. For the special case
of the entropic measure this can indeed be achieved, as shown above.
5.3 Simulations (AV@R–minimizing firms)
In this section we study an example where the firms are average value–at–risk minimizers. Recall that for
λ ∈ (0, 1], and X ∈ L∞(Ω,F, P ), one defines
AV@Rλ(X) ,
1
λ
∫ λ
0
V@Rγ(X)dγ,
where
V@Rγ(X) , inf
{
m | P{X +m < 0} ≤ γ}.
We use the following initial parameters:
• Dimension of the space defining v: 6, dimension of (Ω): 14,
• W1 = 0.02 ∗ (−1,−2,−4,−10,−4,−2,−1,−0.8,−0.5,−0.3, 0, 0, 0, 0)T ,
• W2 = 0.05 ∗ (−0.03,−0.1,−0.18,−0.2,−1,−3,−9,−10,−3,−1,−0.2,−0.18,−0.1,−0.03)T ,
• levels for the AV@R: λ1: 0.05 and λ2: 0.1
The initial aggregate initial risk assessment is 0.68, which decreases to 0.21 after trading. In Figure 4 we
compare the firms’ positions before and after trading. We observe that in contrast with the entropic–risk–
measure case (see Figure 2), the ex–post shapes of the risk profiles have been significantly altered. This is
due to the fact that the risk measure in hand places a heavier weight on the bad states of nature, even at
the cost of the originally good ones Figure 5(a) shows the indirect utility functions corresponding to the
catalogue that each firm offers, and in Figure 5(b) we have plotted an efficient TBR.
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(a) Comparison of W1 and W1 − a(v∗1 , f∗1 )Z∗1 (b) Comparison of W2 and W2 − a(v∗2 , f∗2 )Z∗2
Figure 4: Positions before and after trading.
(a) The indirect utility functions (b) A possible socially efficient TBR
Figure 5: Indirect utilities and a possible efficient TBR.
Remark 5.3 It should be noted that in neither of the examples presented above were the individual ra-
tionality constraints for the firms binding. This is essential to implement the “fix–mix” TBR without the
need of a cash transfer. Although f plays no role in the aggregate income I[v1, v2], it does enter the IR
constraints of each firm. If one wanted to implement a “fix–mix” TBR without a cash transfer scheme,
they would in general run into a two–equations–one–unknown issue as soon as an IR constraint bound.
6 Conclusions
In this paper we have extended the principal–agent models of profit maximization found in [9] and risk
minimization found in [21] to a multi–agency setting. Both of these works deal with OTC trading of
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derivatives under adverse selection. It should be mentioned that in order to deal with the increased
complexity introduced by the enlargement of the set of sellers, additional restrictions had to be imposed
on the set of financially feasible products. On the profit maximization side we made use of results of Reny
and, more recently, Page Jr. & Monteiro to show the existence of (mixed–strategies) Nash equilibria. We
were unable, however, to obtain a similar result in the case of risk minimization. The non–linear impact
of individual contracts on the firms’ risk evaluations is incompatible with the machinery developed by
the authors previously mentioned. Moreover, even if the game were uniformly payoff secure and (weakly)
reciprocal upper semicontinuous, the lack of quasi–convexity would require considering the mixed extension
of the game. This brings us to the following conceptual issue: what is expected risk? Convex risk measures
can be (robustly) represented as a worst–case analysis over a family of probability measures that are
absolutely continuous with respect to the reference one. However, not all of these measures (which can
be interpreted as possible distributions of the future states of the World) are given the same weight.
Indeed, they are penalized according to a function that maps the space of probability measures into the
extended Reals. By considering a mixed extension of our risk–minimization game, we implicitly assume
that “Nature” and the firms behave in qualitatively different ways. In our view this would be inconsistent.
Instead, we introduce the notion of socially efficient allocations and prove the existence of such. We believe
that an important contribution of this paper is to show that, within our stylized setting, non–regulated,
OTC markets cannot be guaranteed to be efficient (in the sense of the welfare theorems). The extension
of our general setting to one where agents have heterogenous initial endowments (multi–dimensional agent
types) and (we believe more interestingly) to a dynamic framework are left for future research.
A Existence of minimizers to Ψ1
In this appendix we give an overview of the proof of existence of minimizers to problem Ψ1 in Section 4.2.1,
which is analogous to the proof of Theorem 2.3 in [21]. The main ideas behind the proof are to relax the
variance constraint to have a convex minimization problem, and then to show that based on a solution to
the latter we can construct a solution to Ψ1. The steps to be taken are the following:
1. We fix (v1, v2) ∈ C1 × C2 and relax the variance constraint to −Var[Xi(θ)] ≤ v′i(θ). We observe that
‖Xi‖22 = vi(a)− vi(0) , kvi .
Let Ki be the uniform bound on the elements of Ci (see Prop. 2.3), then ‖Xi‖22 ≤ kvi ≤ Ki.
2. The convexity of %i implies that the set
X v,fi ,
{
Xi ∈ Xi | Ai(v1, v2, Xi, f) ≤ %i(Wi)
}
is convex. The fact that ρi has the Fatou property implies that X v,fi is closed.
3. Since the mapping
Xi 7→
∫
Θi
Xi(θ)dθ −
∫
Θ0
Xi(θ)fi(θ)dθ,
is a linear, then Xi 7→ Ai(v1, v2, Xi, f) is a convex mapping. The set
X kvii ,
{
X ∈ Xi | ‖Xi‖22 ≤ kvi
}
is a closed, convex and bounded set, hence the relaxed optimization problem has a solution X˜v,fi , as
long as XKi ∩ X v,fi 6= ∅.
4. The variance constraint can be made binding by structuring the products X˜vi into X
v,f
i = X˜
v,f
i +αY.
Here Y is independent of θ and α : Θ→ R integrates to zero.
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B Description of the algorithm used in Sections 5.2 and 5.3
In this appendix we provide a brief description of our numerical algorithm, whose aim is to estimate
solutions to the problem
inf
(Z,f,v)
2∑
i=1
[
%i
(
Wi − Zi
∫ 1
a
√
−v′(θ)fi(θ)dθ
)
+
∫ 1
a
(v(θ)− θ v′(θ))fi(θ)dθ
]
subject to:
• fi ≥ 0, f1 + f2 = 1;
• v convex, v ≥ 0, v′ ≤ 0, v(1) = 0;
• E[Zi] = 0, Var[Zi] = 1.
• %i
(
Wi − Zi
∫ 1
a
√−v′(θ)fi(θ)dθ)+ ∫ 1a (v(θ)− θ v′(θ))fi(θ)dθ ≤ %i(Wi). It should be noted that in the
examples presented in Section 5, this constraint was not binding.
In order to do so, we set a discretization level n, and we work with the following structures:
• f1(λ) ,
∑n−1
k=0 λk11[a+k 1−an ,a+(k+1)
1−a
n ]
, f2 = 1− f1, 0 ≤ λi ≤ 1.
• v′(·) ,
( ∫ 1
· − ddθ
√−v′(θ)dθ +√−v′(1))2, we shall denote v˜ , − ddθ√−v′(θ), and γ ,√−v′(1) ≥ 0.
There is a one–to–one correspondence between v˜ ≥ 0, γ ≥ 0 and functions v that satisfy the re-
quirements of being convex, non–increasing and non–negative. This allows for an easier–to–handle
description of such functions, instead of having to impose more burdensome, global convexity con-
straints, which would be necessary in higher dimensions.
• We go one step further and define v˜(α) ,∑n−1k=0 αk11[a+k 1−an ,a+(k+1) 1−an ], αi ≥ 0.
• Zi , (βi0, . . . , βid−1) ∈ Rd, 1d
∑d−1
k=0 β
i
k = 0,
1
d
∑d−1
k=0(β
i
k)
2 ≤ 1. Following the results presented in
Appendix A, we have relaxed Var[Zi] = 1 to Var[Zi] ≤ 1.
In this setting we have that
%i
(
Wi − Zi
∫ 1
a
√
−v′(θ)fi(θ)dθ
)
= ri(α, β, γ, λ).
and the problem amounts to minimizing the aggregate risk
∑2
i=1 ri(α, β, γ, λ) subject to ri(α, β, γ, λ) ≤
ri(0, 0, 0, 0) and subject to constraints on α, β, γ and λ specified earlier. The latter are convex (in fact most
of them are linear)in the corresponding variables. A crucial property of the functions ri : Rn+2d+1+n → R
is that for any three fixed entries, they are convex on the remaining variable. Exploiting the latter we use
an iterative algorithm that performs a one–step, first–order descent in each direction alternately, such that
the aggregate risk decreases in each step. The algorithm repeats this process until a maximal number of
iterations has been performed or until there is no significant change in the aggregate risk. At each of the
steps we encounter the problem of minimizing a convex function with respect to convex constraints.
Our coding has been done in Java, and we have used the NetBeans IDE 6.8 environment. In the case
of AV@R, we have used the or124.jar package (OR-Objects 1.2.4) to calculate the required gradients.
The descent procedures are all based on a local linearization of the function to be minimized, as well
as of the constraints. Since all of these objects are convex, they can be locally, well approximated by
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Neighborhood of a point near the
boundary
The linearlized boundary
Projection into the
feasible region. 
A non-feasible iteration
Figure 6: Dealing with non–feasible points
the corresponding subgradients (which are calculated using the chain rule). The linearized function is
minimized, subject to the linearized constraints, on a cubic neighborhood of the current point. This
reduces to a linear optimization problem. Again the linear optimization package included in or124.jar
is used to obtain a minimizer. If this point does not satisfy the constraints (we carry the linearization
error), a correction procedure is performed to obtain a feasible point close to the prior one. This procedure
essentially performs a line search in the direction opposite to the direction of the subgradient of the
constraint function at the point in hand (See Figure 6). Finally, it is verified whether at this feasible point
the value of the objective function has decreased. Otherwise, the procedure is repeated starting with a
cube whose size length is half of the original one.
C Convex risk measures on L2.
In this appendix we recall some properties and representation results for risk measures on L2(Ω,P). We
refer the reader to [7] and to section 4.3 in [16] for detailed discussions on this topic.
Definition C.1 (i) A monetary measure of risk on L2 is a function % : L2(Ω,P)→ R∪{+∞} such that
for all X,Y ∈ L2 the following conditions are satisfied:
• Monotonicity: if X ≤ Y then %(X) ≥ %(Y ).
• Cash Invariance: if m ∈ R then %(X +m) = %(X)−m.
(ii) A risk measure is called coherent if it is convex and homogeneous of degree 1, i.e., if the following
two conditions hold:
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• Convexity: for all λ ∈ [0, 1] and all positions X,Y ∈ L2:
%(λX + (1− λ)Y ) ≤ λ%(X) + (1− λ)%(Y )
• Positive Homogeneity: For all λ ≥ 1
%(λX) = λ%(X).
(iii) The risk measure is called law invariant, if
%(X) = %(Y )
for any two random variables X and Y which have the same law.
(iv) The risk measure % on L2 has the Fatou property if for any sequence of random variables X1, X2, . . .
that converges in norm to a random variable X we have
%(X) ≤ lim inf
n→∞ %(Xn).
Since a risk measure % that has the Fatou property is a l.s.c. and proper convex mapping from L2(Ω,P)
into R ∪ {+∞}, we may represent it via a Legendre-Fenchel transform. Namely, if we define M1(P) to be
the set of probability measures on Ω that are absolutely continuous (w.r.t P) and
M21(P) ,
{
Q ∈M1(P)
∣∣ dQ
dP
∈ L2
}
,
then given % there exists a penalty function α : L2(Ω,P)→ R ∪ {+∞} such that
%(X) = sup
Q∈M21(P)
{
EP[−X]− α(Q)
}
.
Moreover, if for Q ∈M21(P) we write Y = dQ/dP, then the above expression can be written as
%(X) = sup
‖Y ‖2=1
{− 〈X,Y 〉 − β(Y )},
where 〈·, ·〉 is the canonical inner product in L2(Ω,P), and β(Y ) = α(Q).
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